The Supreme Court has granted a petition reversing lower court rulings and denied the application for original land registration filed by the heirs of Juana De Lara over a parcel of land in Parañaque City, finding that they failed to prove the possession and ownership required by law.
The Court, in G.R. No. 253763, reversed and set aside the May 7, 2019 Decision and the September 28, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111495.
The Case
The respondents, who are the heirs of Juana De Lara (De Lara), alleged that De Lara had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of a parcel of land with an area of 1,113 square meters located at Barangay Ibayo, Parañaque City, identified as Lot No. 3266, under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial. De Lara died on August 28, 1924, without any issue. She had a sibling named Eugenia De Lara, who died on March 8, 1910. The other respondents are the great-grandchildren, spouses of the deceased great-grandchildren, and great-great-grandchildren of Eugenia.
Lot No. 3266 was originally surveyed from July 8, 1950 to June 30, 1958, and a cadastral survey was conducted on February 8, 1957. The Cadastre for the Municipality of Parañaque, approved on November 3, 1972, showed Lot No. 3266 already in the name of De Lara.
Carmen Costa, one of the heirs, requested the DENR-NCR to formally approve the Advance Plan of Lot No. 3266 on February 17, 1995. PAMC opposed this. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR-NCR dismissed PAMC's opposition. PAMC appealed to the DENR Secretary, who affirmed the order, and later to the Office of the President, which affirmed the DENR Secretary in a March 17, 2003 Decision that attained finality on November 27, 2003.
The heirs of De Lara, represented by their attorney-in-fact Zosimo C. Ponce, filed a Petition dated August 9, 2011 for original registration of title of Lot No. 3266 before the Regional Trial Court. PAMC filed an Opposition, arguing it was the real party in possession of the lot, and claimed Lot No. 3266 is an accretion contiguous to Lot No. 3264, which it owns under TCT No. 106627.
The Issue
The Court addressed whether the respondents proved all the requirements for original registration of land under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, and whether PAMC established its own claim of ownership over Lot No. 3266.
The Ruling
The Court ruled that the respondents failed to prove the existence of all the requirements for original registration. It also found that PAMC was unable to sufficiently prove its claim over the disputed lot.
The dispositive portion reads: "ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 7, 2019 Decision and the September 28, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111495 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by respondents Heirs of Juana De Lara, represented by their attorney-in-fact Amelia N. Aquino, is DENIED."
The Court also ordered that a copy of the Decision be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General for such action as it may deem proper.
By the Numbers
- Lot area: 1,113 square meters
- Lot No. 3266, Cad. 299, Parañaque Cadastre
- De Lara died: August 28, 1924
- Eugenia De Lara died: March 8, 1910
- Survey period: July 8, 1950 to June 30, 1958
- Cadastral survey: February 8, 1957
- Cadastre approved: November 3, 1972
- OP Decision: March 17, 2003, final on November 27, 2003
- August 9, 2011 Petition for original registration
- Real property tax paid in De Lara's name: 1986 to 1999; earliest receipt November 26, 1997
The Court's Reasoning
The Court found that the respondents did not show any specific act performed by them or their predecessors-in-interest to prove their possession and ownership of Lot No. 3266. Aquino did not testify as to how De Lara exercised dominion over the lot, such as whether she cultivated it or built structures on it.
The Court noted Aquino's own admission that none of the heirs of De Lara occupied Lot No. 3266 for the past decades, and that PAMC had been in possession of the property since the 1980s. The Court also observed that the respondents did not explain why tax payments were only made beginning in 1997, even though they claimed De Lara had been in possession since time immemorial. The Court reiterated that the intermittent and sporadic payment of taxes undermines a claim of possession or ownership, and that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive of ownership when not supported by other evidence.
On PAMC's claim, the Court explained that accretion refers to the process whereby soil is deposited along the banks of rivers, and that under Article 457 of the Civil Code, accretion belongs to the owners of the land adjoining the banks of rivers. The Court held that PAMC did not present evidence proving the required elements of accretion, and could not rely on Engr. Erive's statement alone. The Court further noted the OP held in its March 17, 2003 Decision that Lot No. 3266 is an accretion that does not belong to the riparian owner. The Court added that PAMC merely argued that the respondents' application should be denied and did not pray for registration in its name.
Source: Supreme Court Decision, G.R. No. 253763.
This report summarizes a public Supreme Court decision and is not legal advice.