14.5 The examination of the Obligation Requests indicated that the appropriations
for the subject goods intended for distribution were sourced from the Office of
the Governor. Consequently, it appears that both the executive and legislative
branches were involved in delivering certain services to their constituents, with
the executive handling the requisitioning and the legislative managing the
distribution of the goods.
14.6 The foregoing constitutes a violation of the constitutional principle of separation
of powers between the executive and legislative branches. The allocation of
goods to the SP members for distribution within their respective districts
involved the delivery of social services, which falls under the responsibility of
the executive. This activity is unrelated to the SP members’ legislative functions
or the maintenance of their respective offices.
14.7 Management is reminded of the Court’s ruling under GR No. 208566, 208493,
and 209251, all dated November 19, 2013, that as enunciated in Abakada, the
high tribunal held that from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. It further clarified,
however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law,” the legislative body may still
exercise its oversight function and made clear that its role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post-enactment measure allowing legislator participation
beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis, and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions, to quote:
“ Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses or any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14.8 We recommended and Management agreed to stop the practice of involving
the SP members in the distribution of goods to their respective districts to
ensure compliance with the principle of separation of powers and align with
the SP members’ functions outlined in Section 468 of the Local Government
Code.
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